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INTRODUCTION. 
To write briefly about a subject as complex, as varied and as 
patchily understood as "rural development in Africa" is to risk a com-
bination of error, omission and banality, the whole rounded off with 
arrogance. Anything generally true is liable to be so vague as to be 
almost meaningless; and anything more specifically true of any one 
situation is liable to be so particular as to be ungeneralisable. And 
when "the future" is added, with all its imponderables, the difficulties 
are daunting indeed. 
A further problem concerns the values of the writer. A paper 
about perspectives for the future may variously combine discussion of 
(i) what is happening, (ii) what will happen, (iii) what ought to be 
aimed for, and /o r (iv) what ought to be done. While only the latter 
two overtly embody the observer's values, in practice the first two 
do as well, since what is perceived and what is predicted derive from 
acts of selection and judgement. Since, explicitly or implicitly, this 
paper considers all four, I should make clear my basic values, culture-
bound as they are (like everyone else's). In any society there appear 
to me to be two clusters of ideals worth striving towards: an ideal of 
freedom, which includes freedom from constraints like sickness, hunger, 
fear and drudgery, as well as more positive freedoms to make choices 
and for people to live in ways which they themselves value (and not 
necessarily in ways which a government, a social science researcher, 
or a donor agency may think is good for them) ; and an ideal of 
equality which means that these freedoms should be for all, and dis-
tributed in a manner which is more rather than less equal. These two 
ideals overlap with and reinforce the current focus on the eradication 
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of poverty and on the provision of basic needs for all rural people. 
In this paper the elimination of rural poverty is taken as the primary 
objective, and rural development means processes which contribute 
to that objective, especially through enhancing freedom and equality. 
The paper has many limitations. It is based mainly on experience 
in anglophone Eastern Africa. It does not deal with important aspects 
of rural development such as international trade, the penetration of 
capital, fiscal policies, wage and pricing policies, rural-urban terms 
of trade, class formation, political organisation, or political differences 
between countries, important though all of these are. It claims only 
to make selective points and thrusts. For the sake of brevity its style 
is one of assertion, often without supporting evidence. 
The paper considers problems of perceiving rural poverty, outlines 
some of the main trends in rural areas, describes common pitfalls in 
prescribing rural action, and finally outlines six thrusts for future action. 
P E R C E P T I O N S A N D TRENDS. 
Before assessing trends, it is important to understand the present. 
A first question is whether there are systemic misperceptions of rural 
situations, and especially of rural poverty. I shall argue that there are, 
and that these give rise to misleading impressions of rural well-being. 
In the first place, self-perpetuating myths derive from isolated 
projects. Ideologically Kenya and Tanzania are far apart but they 
share a tendency to generate myths of idealised rural institutions and 
well-being. In Kenya, the Mwea Irrigation Settlement has been much 
visited and much praised. Visitors during one-day tours have gained 
very favourable impressions which they have then recounted to others. 
Sheer repetition and mutual reinforcement have sustained a myth of 
relatively higher incomes and levels of welfare than have really existed 
(at least until the early years of this decade) or than has quite genuinely 
been believed to exist by the management of the Scheme (for the 
evidence see Moris 1973). In fact, despite its successes, the Schcmc 
has been marked by seasonal malnutrition, sickness, heavy work for 
women, unsatisfactory housing, bad water supplies, high local costs 
for labour and firewood, and other disadvantages, and incomes have 
been much closer to those of dry-farming neighbours than had been 
supposed. In Tanzania, especially during the latter 1960s, a myth about 
ujamaa was generated partly through frequent visits and writing about 
three isolated initiatives —- the Ruvuma Development Association, the 
Upper Kitete settlement, and Mbambara village — all of which prac-
tised collective production, with a sharing of proceeds. As a result it 
came to be believed, especially in the outside world, that such com-
PERSPECTIVES FOR T H E F U T U R E J 1 6 9 
munal production was widespread in Tanzania. It now seems that, 
apart from token communal fields, it was not. But selective visits to 
those three places and a steady flow of mutually reinforcing reports 
and articles allowed a quite contrary and very misleading impression 
to develop. In both Kenya and Tanzania, then, isolated projects have 
enabled observers to form much more favourable opinions about rural 
development and welfare than more general facts would ever have 
justified. 
Second, geographical visibility biases perceptions towards those 
who are better off. For one part of Western Kenya, Joseph Ssennyonga 
has described what he calls an "elite roadside ecology" (1976:9). As 
services are provided along the roadside —• improved tarmac surface 
for the road, bus services, electricity, telephone and water supply — 
so those who are better-off buy up roadside plots and build on them. 
The poorer people shift away out of sight. The visitor — whether 
from the capital city, the district headquarters, or even the location 
level —- will tend to see the elite and their houses, and not see the 
poorer people and theirs. Again, in many cases the poorest rural areas 
are those which are most remote, most inaccessible, and least visited, 
whether by politicians or by civil servants. Yet again, the very poorest 
rural people are sometimes migrants — in Charles Elliott's phrase "the 
least enviable of men" (1975:129) — and not only politically unim-
portant and impotent, but physically difficult to find. 
Third, the most disadvantaged rural people are often socially 
invisible, or at least unseen. They make less use than their neighbours 
do of health, educational, and other services. They come less to official 
meetings. They may not present themselves or their complaints to 
visiting officials. Officials themselves are locked into relationship with 
the rural elite. This is especially marked with agricultural extension, 
but can also apply to other arms of government. In one case in Kenya, 
junior government staff who surveyed random samples of 100 farmers 
each in the area where they worked were shocked at the poverty they 
encountered and which they had not realized existed. Women heads 
of rural households may be especially poor, especially vulnerable, and 
especially neglected by officials. The contacts of officials are heavily 
biased towards the more prosperous, articulate, and influential local 
people, with whom they share mutually sustaining class interests and 
perceptions. 
Fourth, seasonality is a crucial but seriously neglected aspect of 
rural deprivation. Typically there is an annual crisis during the rains. 
It is the time when food is shortest, the poorer people are weakest, 
diseases are most rampant, and labour inputs are most critical for 
cultivation and weeding, determining future food supplies and cash 
income for those who rely on agriculture. This is the time of year 
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when children and lactating mothers especially suffer most. Yet it is 
also a time of year when officials and others in rural areas are least 
likely to notice, their attention being distracted by the agricultural 
activities which are taking place. It is also a time when rural travel is 
most difficult, and in some areas impossible. Thus much of the worst 
deprivation, which is seasonal, passes unseen. 
A fifth factor is political. "Famine" is sometimes considered a 
shameful word. The case of the Ethiopian famine which contributed 
to the downfall of Haile Selassie is a famous example, but there have 
been similar if less dramatic examples elsewhere. Some governments 
and government officials play down the effects of food shortages, just 
as some voluntary agencies may at times exaggerate them. More 
generally, many of the poorest rural people are politically inarticulate 
and impotent. Rural refugees are a notable case. There are probably 
between one and two million rural refugees in Africa. Most of them 
are in remote border areas, without secure access to land, heavily 
dependent on the sale of their labour and on the purchase of food, 
and exceptionally vulnerable to sickness, malnutrition, and official har-
rassment. Their presence depresses wages and drives up the cost of 
food. If they have money, they can often only exchange it at very 
unfavourable rates. They are, in fact, at the very bottom of the rural 
pile. Yet, apart from the actions of the U N H C R and the interventions 
of host governments and voluntary agencies, they are usually unre-
presented, politically weak, and unable to communicate their needs. 
Sometimes, too, for political reasons, the host government does not 
want to acknowledge their presence. As with famine, so with refugees, 
there can be political reasons for turning a blind eye on severe rural 
deprivation. 
Finally, until recently, social science research itself has tended 
to overlook the poorest rural people. There have been honourable 
exceptions, but the tendency has been to conduct studies in the more 
accessible and more prosperous areas, and to concentrate attention 
on larger rather than smaller farmers, and on farmers rather than the 
landless. Social scientists, especially when working for PhDs, prefer 
to study the studiable and the safe ; and elites are more studiable and 
safer than are the poor. More recently, however, work such as that of 
Philip Mbithi and Carolyn Barnes (1975) on spontaneous and squatter 
settlement in Kenya, and of David Brokensha and E.H.N. Njeru (1977) 
and of Diana Hunt (forthcoming) in Mbere Division in Kenya, have 
opened up a new range of insights into the desperation and deprivation, 
often deepening as a result of "development", of some of the poorest 
rural people. And the disturbing and controversial account given by 
Colin Turnbull (1973) of the Ik, a people dying of starvation in 
Northern Uganda, has revealed a state of degradation which it is 
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difficult to grasp. Even for Turnbull, a social anthropologist living 
on the edge of a village, it was some time before he realized that 
people were dying. They were the older people, weaker than others, 
dying quietly in their huts. If such things are not seen by a resident 
social anthropologist, how much more must they be unseen by the 
passing visitor. 
A further misperception is the failure to recognize the extent, 
speed and irreversibility of environmental degradation. Soil erosion 
was a colonial preoccupation which provoked measures of compulsion 
in unpopular programmes for terracing, blocking gulleys, stock limi-
tation and the like. It is no matter for surprise that in Eastern Africa 
during the first decade of independence from colonial rule, soil erosion 
and stock limitation should have been non-subjects. But the cost of 
that decade of inaction will be heavy, and will be borne by future 
generations. Simultaneously, in much of savannah Africa, population 
has been forced out onto more and more marginal land, moving from 
densely populated more fertile highlands into less populated, more 
marginal lowlands. If Kenya is at all typical, widespread erosion 
appears permanently to have depleted the potential of large areas for 
future grazing and cultivation. In the words of H.S. Darling (1973:6) 
"The soil cover of the surface of any country is its greatest capital 
asset". Because of the agricultural base of many of their economies, 
this is more true for African countries, at least in the short and medium 
term, than it may be for much of the rest of the world. Yet for reasons 
which are a compound of reaction against repressive colonial measures, 
short-term political prudence, geographical inaccessibility, and low 
returns in conventional economic terms to capital investment in conser-
vation measures in marginal areas, there have continued to be capital 
losses through "soil mining" and soil erosion which are probably ir-
reversible short of geological time. These losses have gravely aggravated 
the problem of securing reasonable livelihoods for the poorer rural 
people in the longer term. 
Failures to perceive the nature and extent of rural poverty, and 
the nature and extent of irreversible capita! losses in the environment, 
make even more serious the implications of population growth. UN 
projections (United Nations 1974:64) for Africa as a whole have 
given an increase of 71 per cent in rural populations between 1975 
and 2000 (from 305 million to 522 million). It may be noted that this 
estimate is predicated on a formidable increase of 225 per cent in 
urban populations (from 96 million to 312 million) over the same 
period, and that in some regions, notably Eastern Africa, the anticipated 
rate of increase of rural populations is considerably higher than the 
average of 71 per cent. It is difficult indeed to see how these future 
populations can be sustained at tolerable levels of living in many of 
the rural environments of Africa. 
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Finally, there are dynamic forces at work which tend to accentuate 
rural poverty, including the individualisation of land tenure (as in 
Kenya), population pressures forcing cultivation out onto more and 
more marginal land, large migrations of political and economic refugees, 
a brain and skill drain to urban areas, and the whole complex of 
factors which constitute the "urban bias" which Michael Lipton (1977) 
has described. Even without neo-Marxian analysis, it appears that 
development benefiting the poorer rural people in much of Africa 
may be not only more difficult than is often appreciated, but may be 
becoming increasingly difficult. 
PITFALLS. 
In trying to see a way forward there are many false trails and 
many pitfalls. Four of these are sufficiently common to deserve to be 
set in perspective. 
(i) Portmanteau panaceas. — Writing and speech about rural 
development is larded with vague and emotive words, a conventional 
rhetoric, changing in its fashions but constant or deteriorating in its 
imprecision. Thus we have had modernisation, mobilisation and pene-
tration exhibiting varying degrees of hardiness, while decentralisation, 
coordination, integration and participation appear to have more staying 
power, and dcmocratisation is the most recent to join their ranks. 
The point here is not that these words should be abandoned ; it is, 
rather, that their use should not be allowed, as it often does, to 
substitute for concrete and practical thinking. Long sections of prose 
can be found, especially in UN documents, which combine words like 
these in a mush which slides smoothly over the polished tongue of the 
practised non-thinker. An illusion is created that something is being 
said. Sometimes superlatives are called in to emphasise non-statements. 
But it does not help to call for maximum coordination, to say that 
rural development must be totally integrated, to urge that there must 
be full participation by all the people, unless the detail is spelled out. 
The moral is that those who write and speak prescriptively about rural 
development should be challenged and forced to specify what they 
mean, in terms of who should do what when where and how, whenever 
they use such expressions. If they did so, it would be easier to see how 
often the poorer rural people were likely to be left out. 
(ii) Project-fixation. — It is a commonplace that political leaders, 
civil servants, and donors tend to prefer identifiable photogenic projects 
to dispersed and less tangible programmes. This preference has benefits 
as well as costs, but the costs may be very high and becoming higher 
in terms of benefits foregone by the poorer rural people. Generalisation 
is precarious but the following may be true. The volume of capital aid 
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available for rural development in Africa has risen rapidly in the 
past two years. The numbers of donors active in any one country has 
increased. Bilateral donors are busily seeking poverty-oriented rural 
projects. The World Bank and the UN family are in the fray. The 
European Development Fund and the oil-producing Arab nations with 
their various funds (such as the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development) are extending their activities in Africa south of the 
Sahara, the Arab countries having promised $1.5 billion for Africa. 
IFAD (the International Fund for Agricultural Development) is pre-
paring to join in. But good poverty-oriented projects are scarce. Money 
is unspent. So donors combine to share projects, and seek projects 
which will enable them to spend more, and which therefore are 
liable to be more capital-intensive. The administrative demands on 
recipient countries multiply as they are bombarded by missions. Senior 
staff are harrassed by meetings and negotiations. Dependence may 
increase rather than decline as recipient countries struggle to fulfil 
what Dennis Rondinelli (1976) has appropriately called the "imperious 
rationality" of donors' demands for information and justifications. At 
the same time, there may be an ironical law that the more money has to 
be spent, and the less time there is to spend it in, the more the elites 
will benefit and the less the poorer will gain. Attention and adminis-
trative resources are diverted from wider programmes to narrower 
projects. The danger is that donor pressures and elite preferences will 
result in the reverse of the rhetoric which seeks to help the poorest. 
The moral is that donors should exercise restraint in their demands, 
that governments should resist tendencies for projects to distract atten-
tion and resources from programmes, and that both should treat 
administrative capacity as a scarce resource. 
(iii) Planning without implementation. — The law of prior bias 
— that which comes first in a process gets most, and what comes last 
gets least — is illustrated by experiences with rural planning. Imperious 
rationality, in this case of central government staff and of academics, 
demands extensive information about a rural area before a plan for 
it can be drawn up. A repeated experience in East Africa has been 
the devotion of so much time and effort to data collection and proces-
sing that planning itself is delayed ; and then that planning is so little 
related to what could realistically be achieved that the eventual docu-
ment (a Five-Year Plan for District X, liberally decorated with the 
word "integrated") is a vague set of proposals unrelated to the budget 
process, unimplementable and unimplcmented. Paradoxically, the more 
intelligent and well-informed the planners are, the more are the data 
demanded and the less are the chances of implementation. The moral 
is to start not with planning, but with improving implementation of 
what is already in hand, modifying it and making it more relevant to 
the objectives of reducing and eradicating poverty as a continuous 
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iterative process. It is sounder and easier at the local level to move 
from implementation to planning than from planning to implementation. 
(iv) Pessimism and paralysis. — Social science research tends 
to generate pessimism which discourages and paralyses. In rural 
development, social scientists follow fashions. The latest fashion is 
usually the latest government initiative. In Eastern Africa, following 
changing government priorities, the fashions have successively favoured 
settlement schemes, cooperatives, rural planning and decentralisation. 
In each case attention has been concentrated on these initiatives in 
their early stages when most has been going wrong. The outcome 
(often a few years later) is a literature which gives the impression that 
there are serious inherent weaknesses in the approach ; but the litera-
ture tends to appear at a time when many of the most important 
lessons have been learnt and the teething troubles overcome. By then, 
however, the social scientists have moved on to the next fashion. 
Trained to criticise, they excel in observing what is going wrong, and 
are weak in proposing how things should be done better. The danger 
here is that the trend of university education will be away from in-
volvement and towards a critical negativism. It is sad that Colin Leys 
should end his analysis of underdevelopment in Kenya with the obser-
vation that 
academic studies can cont r ibute little to the e f fo r t to achieve new strategies 
of deve lopment g rounded in the interests of the mass of those w h o are 
current ly the victims of underdeve lopment . Pe rhaps the most such studies 
can do is to try not to obscure the s t ructure of exploi ta t ion and oppress ion 
which underdeve lopment produces , and which in turn sustain it (1975: 275). 
Academic studies in Africa have only relatively recently begun to 
focus on "the mass of those who are currently the victims of under-
development". It is early indeed to judge what effect those studies 
can and will have. But it is at least possible, and certainly to be hoped, 
that they will not only expose and communicate the situation of the 
poorer rural people, but will also contribute to strategies for impro-
vement. The moral here in the context of rural poverty, as earlier 
with settlement schemes, cooperatives, rural planning and decentrali-
sation, is that social scientists should not give up too soon and that 
they should pay much more attention to effective communication both 
to governments and to the international community. 
PROPOSALS. 
For the eradication of rural poverty the most crucial measures 
may often be related to land tenure, access to services, and marketing 
and pricing systems. To varying degrees, these depend upon the struc-
ture and operation of the political system in a country. It may be 
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important in some environments to point out repeatedly that growing 
landlessness associated with unequal distribution of land and changes 
in tenure may be generating much deprivation. But the purpose here 
is to propose measures of a different sort : measures which may be 
both appropriate and politically feasible in a wide range of countries, 
and which may contribute both towards the reduction of rural poverty 
and towards the creation of preconditions for its elimination. Six are 
put forward : 
(i) Social science research on rural poverty. — Social science 
research should now focus more on the nature, structure and dynamics 
of rural poverty. Work such as that carried out in Kenya by Philip 
Mbithi and Carolyn Barnes (1975), David Brokensha and E.H.N. 
Njeru (1977), and Diana Hunt (forthcoming) should be repeated much 
more widely. Care should be taken to avoid the biases of the past 
towards studying conspicuous projects (inea culpa) to the neglect of 
less visible people. Possible measures are : 
— the encouragement and sponsoring of student dissertations based on 
rural residence and research (as has already led to useful work in 
the Universities of Dar es Salaam and Nairobi) 
— the involvement of university staff in action research in which they 
are participant observers 
— more post-doctoral research based on rural residence. At the post-
doctoral stage it should be easier to adopt the more innovative and 
risky approaches which will sometimes be needed 
— extensive and heavy subsidies for publications concerned with rural 
poverty. It is absurd that so much money should be chasing so few 
poverty-oriented rural development projects and yet books and publi-
cations on rural poverty should remain inaccessible and often expen-
sive, out of reach of many officials and academics 
— far greater attention paid by researchers to the communication of 
their results to policy-makers, whether through articles in the press, 
workshops and seminars, or personal lobbying. The law of prior 
bias operates conspicuously with social science research to the grave 
neglect of efficient communication. 
(ii) International diffusion of technology. — The diffusion of 
technology — both physical and organisational between countries in 
Africa and between Third World countries more generally is still very 
ineffective, and often mediated through the former metropolis or 
another richer country. Two examples of innovations with very consi-
derable potential which have not been diffused can be cited from 
Botswana. 
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The first is the brigade movement in Botswana (see iv below). 
The second is a system of grazing management pioneered in Southern 
Africa by a Rhodesian ecologist, Alan Savory. The "Savory System" 
of short duration grazing has been quite widely adopted within white-
dominated Southern Africa but is currently only practised outside on 
one site in Botswana, the Brigade Ranch at Serwe near Serowc. Under 
this system, the conventional wisdom about grazing control and stocking 
rates is stood on its head. Grazing is improved not by reducing stock 
numbers, but by increasing them. If the system is as good as is claimed, 
the cost of delays in examining its effectiveness and its applicability 
in other parts of Africa must be enormous. Yet for seven years it 
has been in operation in Botswana and has apparently not been 
adopted or tried out anywhere else in independent Africa. 
A problem with both the brigades and with the Savory system 
is that they are not linked to any international organisation. In contrast, 
the organisational system for smallholder tea pioneered by the Kenya 
Tea Development Corporation was linked to the Commonwealth De-
velopment Corporation and the World Bank, and, having proved 
itself in Kenya, was then spread to Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi and 
Burundi. 
For innovations which lack international linkages of this sort, 
solutions can be sought through the organisation of meets. The Com-
monwealth Secretariat has organised a meet at Arusha in Tanzania 
for the display of appropriate technology equipment from many coun-
tries. Other regional or Panafrican organisations might follow suit. 
Countries might act as hosts to meets at which they would explain and 
demonstrate their own poverty-reducing innovations, whether physical 
or organisational, to other countries. There would be dangers of biases 
towards political pet projects, specially favoured areas, specially visible 
types of initiative, and presenting only the best, the proven, and the 
accepted. But if these could be guarded against to include, for example, 
approaches designed for the poor and the deprived (the formation of 
women's groups, providing land for the landless, rural employment 
projects, and the like), and also new and exciting ideas even if as 
yet unproven, the benefits might be considerable. 
(iii) Environment-specific future-oriented R and D. — This 
proposal requires a radical departure from conventional thinking, and 
may in the longer term have more potential than most others for 
creating a better rural society. It involves examining the future relative 
resource endowments of specific rural environments and asking what 
technologies (which may not yet exist) would be desirable in order to 
knit those endowments together. The main resources can be taken as 
people, land, water and energy. The criteria for acceptable technologies 
will depend upon the observer. The writer's own list has five main 
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criteria — productivity of those resources which are relatively scarcer ; 
equity in access and distribution ; livelihood-intensity of techniques ; 
non-seasonality of food and income flows ; and stability in the environ-
ment. Instead of waiting for technologies to be developed (in which 
case they may well turn out to be inappropriate) this proposal requires 
deliberate intervention, internationally as well as nationally, to create 
technologies which can be specified but which do not yet exist. 
This approach, if adopted with imaginative lateral thinking, should 
identify the comparative advantages of different environments and 
ways in which the much larger rural populations which can be antici-
pated might be provided with livelihoods. The technologies prescribed 
for future scenarios would vary considerably, but many might share 
the more efficient exploitation of sunlight as an energy source. Much 
of tropical Africa, especially the belts of tropical rain forest, has 
enormous, largely untapped sources of energy. At the same time, oil 
imports impose a heavy burden on the balance of payments of many 
countries and by raising transport costs contribute to low prices paid 
to food producers and high prices paid for food by urban consumers. 
Technologies — whether chemical, bio-chemical, or involving direct 
use of organic fuels for road locomotion — which exploit local renewable 
resources — could generate livelihoods (among those who collect 
leaves or wood and sell them, among those who work on energy farms, 
among those engaged on food production). But unless there is imagi-
native and well-informed intervention at an early stage, either tech-
nologies of this sort will not be developed, or if developed, will be 
unlikely to have an appropriate livelihood-intensity. 
To pursue this proposal requires a series of inventive explorations, 
backed with resources to ensure that the necessary R and D is carried 
out. This might well involve rich country as well as African R and D. 
It might make good use of some of the poverty-oriented aid funds 
which at present are having such difficulty in finding suitable outlets. 
(iv) Alternative organisation. — There has been a tendency for 
government bureaucracy, whether in regular departments or in various 
sorts of parastatals, to be regarded as the proper, even inevitable, 
means for achieving certain forms of rural development. Alternative 
organisations, especially Christian missions, have tended to be tolerated 
as colonial relics, but to be eased out of their positions of influence 
in the provision of services, especially rural education. There is, however, 
a case for alternative organisations for rural innovation and training. 
These can depart from the mission model, and may receive govern-
ment subventions, while retaining their independence. The example 
of the Brigades in Botswana deserves to be carefully studied in other 
African countries. The Brigades have over the past decade experimented 
in many activities such as community education, more relevant syl-
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labuses in secondary schools, school-leaver training in many different 
skills, the Savory system of short duration grazing, and the develop-
ment of a new tool bar (the makgonatsotlhe) which promises to bring 
cultivation within reach of many more of the poorer and weaker rural 
people, and have contributed much to rural development in Botswana. 
They have combined an ethos of idealism and service with an openness 
to new ideas and a capacity to innovate which are difficult to achieve 
in government organisations. If Botswana's experience could be repli-
cated, brigade-type alternative organisations might show elsewhere 
the same capacity to complement and supplement government action, 
for example in perceiving the nature and extent of rural poverty, in 
identifying and exploiting opportunities, in inventing techniques, in 
diffusing innovations, and in training. 
(v) Decentralisation. — Like the other "-ations", decentralisation 
is a word intermittently and often rather vaguely in vogue. Both as 
devolution of authority from the capital city, and as deconcentration 
of staff and resources from the capital to the regions, provinces, districts 
and subdistricts, its importance as a component in rural development 
would be difficult to exaggerate (for a recent presentation of the case, 
see Lele 1975). Urban bias in life styles, aspirations, careers, migration, 
and services militate continuously against rural development. Decen-
tralisation is far from popular with civil servants and far from easy 
to carry out as has been shown by the varied experiences of Tanzania 
which did move staff out from Dar es Salaam, and Zambia which failed 
to move staff out of Lusaka. But priority for rural development is best 
achieved, as Chinese experience suggests, through putting staff and 
resources into the rural areas at the cost of the urban. 
Ideally, decentralisation and the philosophy which underlies it 
should be pushed right down to the lowest levels. The best procedure 
may be to proceed by stages, for example through block grants to 
staff at provincial or regional level, and later through pushing such 
grants further down to districts and subdistricts, with increased devo-
lution of responsibility and discretion at the same time. 
(vi) Reversals of demand. — A process of central importance in 
diminishing rural poverty, and complementing decentralisation, can be 
described as reversing demand. At present, all too often, the main 
flows are orders and demands from the centre outwards to the peri-
phery, from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy, from the government 
servant to the citizen, from the patron to the client, f rom the employer 
to the employee, from the "have" to the "have-not". A reversal of 
these flows would mean that demands were flowing more powerfully 
upwards and inwards. 
These reversals have many faces : the extension worker who 
listens to farmers instead of talking at them ; the women's group that 
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demands that the health visitor come and instruct them ; the radio 
listening groups in Botswana which sent in their questions about the 
new land policy to ministers and then listened for their broadcast 
replies ; the agricultural workers' trade union that negotiates higher 
wages from plantations ; the landless who seize land as squatters and 
demand security on that land. 
Some of these reversals will take place anyway. They become 
more likely as educational levels rise among rural people. Many other 
reversals can be promoted through special programmes for the for-
mation of groups of the poorer people and for the encouragement 
of group awareness. Carefully designed and selected programmes in 
specialised fields may be able to serve as a focus. For example, pro-
grammes involving local communities in tackling malnutrition may con-
centrate the attention of government staff and of local leaders on many 
of those who are most deprived, and help to illuminate the nature and 
causes of malnutrition, providing a basis for more radical measures 
which will strike closer to the heart of the problems of rural poverty. 
CONCLUSION. 
Between these six thrusts there are complementarities. Greater 
understanding of rural situations and of rural poverty can be achieved 
through research ; innovations and inventiveness can be promoted 
through the international diffusion of techniques, through future-
oriented R and D, and through alternative organisations; and respon-
siveness to the needs of the poorer people can at least be approached 
through progressive decentralisation and through programmes and 
measures designed to reverse the flow of demands. There are many 
objections to these proposals and their feasibility will vary by country 
and region. But if the argument of this paper is correct, the poorer 
rural people are often worse off and more vulnerable than is com-
monly perceived, and the environment in which many of them are 
living is often deteriorating. For many, conditions can be expected 
to get worse. For those who see weaknesses or omissions in these 
proposals the challenge is to put forward others which are comple-
mentary or which are more feasible, politically and administratively, 
and more appropriate for improving the lot of the poorer rural people 
in ways which they will welcome. 
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